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ost law professors and
lawyers are convinced that
the Supreme Court has a
special capacicy to be guided
by constitutional values. Professor Ronald
Dworkin of Oxford and New York
University Law School described the
Supreme Court as "an institution that
calls some issues from the battleground of
power politics to the forum of principle."
The Supreme Court "is predestined in
the long run not only by the thrilling
tradition of Anglo-American law but also
by the hard facts of its position in the
structure of American institutions,"
Professor Henry Hart of Harvard Law
School agreed, "to be a voice of reason,
charged with the creative function of
discerning afresh and of articulating
and developing impersonal and durable
principles of constitutional law." Elected
officialswho make the slightest effort to
limit federal judicial power bring down
the wrath of a united bar. Lawyers of different political persuasions do not agree
on much, but most wax eloquent about
the virtues of a n independent judiciary.
American constitutional history does
not support these ritual celebrations.
Everyone lionizes the judicial decision in
Brown u. Board of Education (1954). A fair
consensus bas developed that the Supreme
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Court during the 1950s and 1960s
improved the quality of constitutional
justice in the United States by prohibiting
official school prayer, protecting free
speech, providing counsel for impecunious
criminal defendants, and requiring more
equitable legislative districting. When discussion moves from the Warren Court to
the other 204 years ofAmerican histdry,
the merits of judicial review and judicial
independence are less clear. By almost any
standard, the Court performed worse than
Congress until 1954 and arguably has
not performed better (or much better)
afta 1969.
Judicial review of federal legislation
does not appear to have served any noble
purpose for the first 165 yean of wnstitutional life. Not one Supreme Court
decision declaring an important federal
law unconstitutional in this time period is
presently thought correct by most scholars
or informed citizens. More often, a broad
consensus chastises the justices for striking
down beneficial policies well within the
constitutional powers of Congress. Most
lawyers praise Marbury v. Madiron (1803)
for justifying judicial review of federal
legislation, hut few insist that the decision
declaring unconstitutional an obscure
section of the Judiciary Act was important
or wrrect. Almost all lawyers condemn
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Dred Scott v. Sandfird (1836), the next
instance when the Supreme Court declared
a federal law unconstiturional. Very
few law professors have good words for
Hqburn v. Griiwold (1869). the decision
declaring that Congress unconstitutionally
made paper money legal tender during
the Civil War, Pollock u. Fannm'Loan
and Trwt Company (1895), the decision
declaring the federal income tax uncnnstitutional, and the judicial decisions striking
down New Deal legislation during the
1930s. Bolling v. Sbarpe (1954) is the fust
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case in American history in which a
consensus now exists that the Supreme
Court correctly declared a federal law
unconstitutional.
Whether the Burger, Rehnquist, and
Roberts Courts have demonstrated more
constitutional fidelity than national elected
officials is controversial at best. The
Supreme Court during the Rehnquist
years declared more federal laws unconstitutional than at any other time in
American judicial history. The federal laws
struck down included affirmative action
policies, regulations on campaign finance,
limits on commercial advertising, measures
expanding religious freedom, restrictions
on state sovereignty, and efforts to use the
interstate commerce power to regulate
non-economic activities. No consensus
exists as to whether any of these decisions
was correct. Many conservatives believe
the Rehnquist Court correctly interpreted
the Constitution of the United States.
Liberals disagree. Whatever the constitutional merits of the decisions, few would
argue that the Supreme Court in recent
years has shown special solicitude for
discrete and powerless minorities, unless
one regards the Coors Brewing Company
or persons wishing to spend millions of
dollars in political campaigns as the most
unfortunate Americans.
Readers who question this assessment
might consider doing a survey using any

Most scorecards will
include more cases
in which the
Supreme Court
struck down
constitutional laws
than instances when
the justices voided
measures.
constitutional law text commonly assigned
in undergraduate or law classes. Leave
out the Warren years and consider only
Supreme Court decisions declaring federal
laws unconstitutional or perhaps only
Supreme Court decisions declaring important federal laws unconstitutional. Most
scorecards, I suspect, will include more
cases in which the Supreme Court struck
down constitutional laws than instances
when the justices voided unconstitutional
measures. The survey of decisions declaring
state laws unconstitutional is likely ,
to be more complicated. Still, for evely
Brown u. Board ofEducation, there is a
R-igy u. Pennrylvania (1842) holding that
northern states could not provide statutory
protections for free residents of color
accused of being fugitive slaves.

When thinking about the role of
courts, lawyers, legal scholars and d t i v n s
should not automatically treat Brown as
a paradigm and such cases as Dred Scott,
Hepburn, Pollock and others as anomalies.
Seen from broader history perspective,
Brown is far more anomalous than
Dred Scott. Throughout most of American
history (and in many new constitutional
democracies), progressives sought legislative victories and played defense in
court. The Supreme Court, reformers
understood, was far more likely to declare
unconstitutional legislative efforts to
promote political equality than prevent
elected officials from discriminating
unjustly Times may change, but a good
case can be made that, by protecting white
persons from affirmative action programs
and affluent Americans from campaign
finance restrictions, the contemporary
Supreme Court is merely reverting
to form.
Rofirsor Mark Graber is rccognkd ar one of the
kading rchohn in the county on c o ~ n ~ t u t i o n a l
L w andpolitits. His books includP Dred Scon and
rhe Problem of Consrirurional Evil, Rethinking
Abortion, ondTransforming Free Speech, and
heir the author of icorm of L w r&m drn'cb~.
Rofer~or Grnber haa taught at the h w srrhool since
2 0 0 2 and orgon2zcr i u annual Conrtituriond Lzw
"Schmooze,"themtionj kdnggarhm'nz of h w
and political~cignce.prnfi~urr.
He hold; n joint
.
npp,potnnv,~,inr iior to., . ~ r , I,u.,l mrltb D<pdrmut,r
,u/c;ouernnwnr mi Polrrr:; 2, rhr Unrumzm d
~ a ~ L CoNege
n d Park.

J D FALL 2008

